The proposition that if A were true, then C would be true is true at a world 10 iff: ci t her (1) there arc no possible ^-worlds or (2) some /I-world where C holds is closer to w than is any /1-world where C docs not hold.
(D3)
Where c and e are occurrcnt events, e depends counterfactually on c iff: if c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred.
(D4) c and e are distinct events iff:
(1) c is not identical to e; and (2) neither event is a constituent of the other. 5 (D5) Where c and e arc occurrcnt events, e depends causally on c iff:
(1) c and e arc distinct events; and (2) if c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred. Ibid., pp. 3-5. 5 Swain gives a more detailed account of event distinction in "Causation and Distinct Events," in Peter van Inwagcn, cd.. Time and Cause, (Dordrecht: Keidel, 1980) , 155-169. (D6) Where c, d\,...., rfn i is a sequence of occur rent events (but not necessarily a temporal sequence, and where c and e may be the only members), this sequence is a causal chain iff:
(1) d\ depends causally on c; and (2)</2 depends causally on d\; and... (n) dn depends causally on dn.\; and (n+l)e depends causally on dn. Swain suggests the following as a first approximation to an analysis of causation:
Where c and c are specific events that occurred, c is a cause of c iff: there is a causal chain of occurrcnt events from c to t.
He argues, however, that (D7) is inadequate for two reasons. The first is that it docs not guarantee the asymmetry of causation. If c is a cause of e, then e can not be a cause of c. (D7) seems to violate this principle. If e had not occurred, then some cause of e must also have failed to occur. If c is the cause which would fail to occur, there will be a chain of causal dependence from e to c; so according to (D7), c caused e and e caused c. Lewis argues that the relation of counterfactual dependence is asymmetric, and that causal asymmetry follows as a corollary. According to Lewis, the closest possible world in which e does not occur will be one in which all of the causes of e occui anyway. In his paper 'Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,' 6 Lewis offers criteria for judging, of two worlds w\ and 102, which is closer to the actual world w. His criteria, however, do not guarantee that w\ will be closer to w than is u>2 if u>2 violates the laws of w and w-[ docs not. Thus, the closet possible world in which a particular event e does not occur may (and typically will) be one in which the laws of nature of the actual world are violated. Swain rejects this view of countcrfactuals; he argues that the candidates for being the possible world closest to w will be ones in which the natural laws of w are not violated. Informally, c can be a cause of e, but not vice versa, if there is a world in which c occurred, but e didn't, which is closer to the actual world than is any in which e occurred and c didn't, where the distance between two worlds is measured by the number of events that occur in one world but not both. 10 This is intended to rule out the possibility of c and e being treated as causes of one another.
The second problem with (D7), according to Swain, is that it will fail in cases of causal ovcrdetermination: cases where two (or more) events, each one sufficient by itself to cause e, both occur, each having an equal claim to being a cause of e. It is not true of any overdctcrmining cause, that had it not occurred, the effect would not have occurred. An example would be a man's being killed by being simultaneously shot through the heart by two bullets: had cither bullet not been shot, he still would have died. Causal ovcrdetermination must not be confused with causal preemption. In cases of causal preemption, two (or more) events occur, each sufficient by itself to cause e, but where the occurrence of one prevents the others from actually having a hand in bringing about the effect. (D7) is equipped to treat cases of causal preemption, 11 but in cases of ovcrdetermination, it runs into trouble. Swain's strategy for tackling the problem of 9 A printing error in the original article caused the last clause to misread: "some event g occurs in iv2 such that e is not causally dependent upon /in w but e is causally dependent upon/in vq."
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In this informal paraphrase, I ignore difficulties in interpreting the modal expressions "would have to be different" and "would only have to have been different". Since definition (D7") already involves quantification over possible worlds, it is to be hoped that these modal expressions can be eliminated in favor of quantified expressions. Swain's intentions arc not entirely clear on this point, however. See, e.g. Lewis, "Causation, " p. 191 Unfortunately, the seeming advantages of Swain's revisions to (D7) vanish under careful examination. I will present several examples where Swain's analysis fails to correctly diagnose the causal situation. 13 Some win exploit technical details in Swain's account. It will be argued, however, that the difficulties raised by these examples can not be circumvented by severing the relevant details from the rest of the account. Other examples will point to more general difficulties with Swain's analysis. 12 Swain, "A Counterfactual Analysis," p. 16. 13 It deserves to be mentioned that Martin Bun/.l ("Causal Preemption and Counterfactuals," Philosophical Studies 37 (1980): 115-124) and Wayne Davis ("Swain's Counterfactual Analysis of Causation," Philosophical Studies 38 (1980): 169-176) have suggested counterexamples to Swain's account. I believe these counterexamples may be handled by straightforward and natural revisions, but I will not discuss this issue here.
The first telling problem is that according to Swain's analysis, there arc no causes; at any rate, the existence of causes implies a restriction on possible worlds which seems unwarranted. As a preliminary, note that while condition (D7") is disjunctive, disjunct (0) is parasitic upon the condition described in disjunct (A). The clause "c would have been causally prior to e" in (D7")(D)(b) entails that there is some possible world w (not necessarily the actual world) in which c and e satisfy the relation of causal priority defined in (D7*) and repeated in (D7")(A). It follows that if c docs not stand in the relation of causal priority to e in any possible world, then both disjuncts of (D7") will fail. Now suppose that c and e arc any two occurrcnt events-we may suppose, to make the counterexample more vivid, that c actually causes e. If c is a cause of e, according to Swain's analysis, there must be some possible world in which c is causally prior to e. That is, there must be some world, w, with respect to which c and e satisfy condition (D7*). Clause (iii) of (D7*) asserts: "where u>2 is a world in which e occurs, and c docs not occur,...u»2 would have to be different from u> in at least the following I respect |:...some event g occurs in v>2 such that e is not causally dependent upon g in w but e is causally dependent upon g in u>2." It is easy, however, to construct a world in which e occurs and c doesn't, which docs not have such an additional causal dependence. Let 102 be the world which differs from w in these respects: 1) c fails to occur in w; and 2) e is brought about by two overdetermining causes (say, d and /), neither one of which occurs in w. Since the events d and / over determine e, e is causally dependent on neither of then, so condition (D7')(iii) fails. (Recall that causal dependence, as defined in (D5), requires counterfactual dependence, which is absent in cases of causal overdetermination.) There is a similar counterexample if e is brought about by a pre-empting cause in ur?. No argument has been offered fur the conclusion that 1^2 is a possible world, but it is hard to sec what might disqualify it. Swain allows that an effect may be brought about by different causes in different possible worlds, and he admits that an effect may be brought about by overdetcrmining causes. 102 simply combines these two possibilities.
One possible solution to this problem immediately suggests itself: allow for the possibility of disjunctive events. In the example above, d-or-f could be considered as a single event. If this event had not occurred-if neither d nor/ had occurrcd-in u>2, then e would not have occurred. With this ontological addition the counterexample vanishes. This would patch up the problem, but it would raise a new problem: Swain would owe an account of disjunctive events. Simply admitting disjunctive events without some modification of the theory would lead to undesirable results. For example, suppose my striking the cue ball on a particular occasion caused the sinking of the eight ball. Then Swain's current account would treat the disjunctive event of my-striking-the-cue-ball-or-a-nuclear-holocaust as a cause of the eight ball's going into the side pocket; this disjunctive event would also satisfy Swain's criterion (D7*). This is certainly odd: had the disjunctive event occurred by virtue of the occurrence of the second disjunctthe nuclear holocaust-the eight ball would have disintegrated rather than have gone into the side pocket. Thus, if Swain is to modify his account by admitting disjunctive events, he will have to make many further revisions. Ad hominem. Swain's choice to treat causal ovcrdetermination by adding disjunct (D) to (D7'), rather than by admitting disjunctive events, shows an unwillingness to make these revisions.
There arc, of course, many more revisions to (D7') which might be attempted. The problems uncovered by the above counterexample, however, are deep enough to raise doubts about the possibility of any successful revision. It may well be that the only revision of (D7')(iii)(2) that will save the causal phenomena is the replacement of "e is causally dependent upon g in 102" with "e is caused by g in u>2" or some cxtcnsional equivalent. It seems at least prima facie likely that in order for e to be brought about in the absence of one of its actual (non-ovcrdctcrmining) causes, it would be both necessary and sufficient to have some event be a new cause of it. Of course, to make this modification would be to flirt with vicious circularity. Swain himself foreshadows this difficulty:
...to imagine e without c, you need to imagine that something prevented c from occurring and something else caused e, but to get c without e you only need to imagine that something prevented c from causing e. Of course, this way of putting the matter neatly begs the question concerning the causal facts in this case, but the difference noted provides us with the key to capturing asymmetry. 14 If c had not occurred,/ would have caused g, which would have caused e. As it happened, however, c prevented g from occurring, thus breaking the link from / to e. The success of Swain's account depends on there being a chain of counterfactual dependence from c to e. It is not true that if c had not occurred, then e would not have occurred; it is alleged, however, that if c had not occurred, then d would not have occurred, and that had d not occurred, e would not have occurred (the causal chain from / toe having already been preempted due to c's preventing g). The success of the latter counterfactual, however, demands that the counterfactual 'If d had not occurred, c would have occurred anyway' be true: a dangerous assumption if the actual laws of nature must hold in the closest possible world in which d fails to occur. Some cause of d must fail to occur in this closest possible world, and there is no guarantee that c will not be this disappearing cause.
Pushing the above problems aside, wc may now focus our attention on the second disjunct of (D7"), which gives Swain's account of overdetcrmination. There is a serious flaw with this account: it grants preempted causes the status of genuine causes. Swain evidently wants to prevent the analysis from going through by saying that (b)(i) is not satisfied: since c was, in actuality, preempted, there is no causal chain from c to e consisting wholly of occurrcnt events. Here Swain would be simply mistaken. There is such a causal chain, namely the sequence c, e: in the absence of d, e is causally dependent upon c, and both c and e arc occurrcnt events. The fact that in the absence of d, the events leading from c to e did not all occur in the actual world does not affect the status of the causal chain c, e. Clearly, Swain's notion of a causal chain consisting wholly of occurrcnt events is a much weaker one than it first appeared: it docs not come close to the intuitive notion of an occurrcnt causal mechanism or process which motivated Swain's account of causal ovcrdetermination. While Swain's strategy is intuitively comprehensible, it is hard to see how it can be explicated in Swain's vocabulary of causal chains. 15 15 Peter Mcnzics ("Probabilistic Causation and Causal Processes: A Critique of Lewis," Philosophy of Science 56 (1989) : 642-663) offers an objection to Lewis's account which is analogous to that raised in this paragraph.
I share Swain's discomfort with Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation. Swain's goal, a counterfactual theory of causation in which the actual laws of nature arc held sacred when evaluating the possible world closest to the actual one, is an admirable one. The failure of his account to provide a sound alternative to Lewis's, however, suggests that Swain's admirable goal is also an impossible one. 16 
